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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by James LeRoy Eagar ( "Eagar") from the May 12, 1999 final
judgment of the Honorable Rodney F. Page of the Second Judicial District Court of Davis
County, State of Utah in favor of appellees (collectively "Bell"). Pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) (1996), this appeal was assigned to this court which has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the parties' agreement with respect to the

lease was unambiguous? If the agreement is unambiguous the court may exclude extrinsic
evidence. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773 (Utah 1957). This issue
was raised at trial court. R. 61, 341-342, 590 at 28.
2.

If there were ambiguities in the contract, was the appellant the draftsman of

the contract? Ambiguities in contracts are to be construed against the draftsman. Sears v.
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982). This issue was raised at trial court. R. 341-342.
3.

Did the trial court err in denying the motion for summary judgment of

appellant? If there were no disputed material issues of fact in favor of appellant, or if there
were disputed material issues of fact, then such motion should have been denied. This issue
was raised in the trial court. R. 403-406.
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and Utah Code Jud. Admin R. 4-501 are determinative. See
Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action involves the purchase by appellee of appellant's business. Appellant was
in the aquaculture business, selling equipment and supplies to fish hatcheries.
Appellant had founded this business and worked in if for a number of years, but had
decided to sell his business. This led to the offer to purchase the business by appellee.
Appellee offered to purchase the business at a specified price which included obtaining lease
of premises used by the business, which were also owned by appellant, for $2,281.00 per
month (the amount paid by the corporation at the time of the sale) for a term often years.
The parties ultimately agreed on the sales price and terms for the business, including a five
year lease of premises at the rate of $2,281.00 per month, subject to annual adjustments
based upon the consumer price index after the second year and a five year option to extend
the lease upon the same terms, subject to adjustment to reflect changes in the consumer price
index.. Appellant failed to produce the lease as required by the agreement and appellee filed
suit to enforce the provisions of said lease.
Page -2-

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

The trial court granted appellee's motion for partial summary judgment and denied
appellant's motion for summaryjudgment on May 12, 1999. R. 539-541; R. 590 at 28-30.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellee purchased the business in January of 1997. He learned of the business
through a broker with the Business Resource Center, a business brokerage company, in the
fall of 1996. Since he was interested in purchasing the business, he made an offer to
purchase the business. The terms of the offer included the terms, purchase price and payment
for the assets of the business, and a requirement that the building, which was also owned by
appellant, be leased to appellee upon the same terms and conditions as it had been leased to
the company at the time of the sale for a period often (10) years from the date of sale. R.
64.
In response to his offer, appellee received a counter offer modifying the terms of
purchase, and specifying that a five year lease at current rate subject to adjustment pursuant
to the consumer price index annually after the second year, together with an option to extend
the lease upon the same terms for an additional five year term. Appellee accepted appellant's
counteroffer. R. 67-68.
Appellee and appellant subsequently executed a Release of Contingencies, again
stating the terms of the lease as outlined herein, and entered into a purchase agreement for
Page -3-

the business. R. 71. Appellees agreed that appellant would subsequently present a lease
embodying these terms agreed upon to appellees. Although several draft leases were
presented none of them embodied the terms agreed upon in the Counteroffer. R. 73-76,252299.
The trial court found that the Counteroffer and Contingency Removal were
unambiguous and that appellees were entitled to declaratory judgment establishing the
existence of the lease and requiring that appellant provide a written lease to appellees. R.
590 at 27. The trial court further denied appellant's motion for summary judgment. R. 590
at 27-30.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The parties agreed to the terms of a triple net lease for a term of five years at the
specified rate of $2,281.00 per month, subject to adjustment reflecting changes in the
consumer price index after the second year and subsequently. They agreed that these were
the material terms of this lease, and that the lease was to be drafted by appellant and
delivered to appellees. This agreement was set forth with clarity in the Counteroffer and the
Contingency Removal.
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ARGUMENT
A,

THE APPELLANT HAS ADMITTED ALL RELEVANT PACTS
AS ALLEGED BY APPELLEES, LEA VING ONLY THE LEGAL
ISSUE AS TO THE INTERPRETATIONOFTHE CONTRACT
WHICH ENTITLES APPELLEES TO DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

Appellant has admitted the execution of each and every document relevant to this
matter. Both the Counteroffer and the Contingency Removal are clear and unambiguous
documents, outlining the terms of the lease.
The terms of the lease were set forth with clarity in both the Counteroffer (R. 67-68)
prepared by appellant and in the Contingency Removal (R. 71). These terms were:
1.

The lease was to be for five (5) years.

2.

The lease was to be triple net.

3.

The lease rate was to be $2,281.00 for the first two years, plus the
expenses involved in the triple net.

4.

The balance of the five year term was to be at a base rent adjusted
pursuant to changes in the consumer price index.

5.

There was to be onefive-yearoption upon the terms existing at the time
of the exercise of the option, adjusted to reflect changes in the
consumer price index.

The Contingency Removal guaranteed that the lease would be valid and would be
produced by appellant. Despite the passage of nearly two years, appellant failed to produce
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the lease in question, and further continued to refuse to produce the lease required until
ordered to do so by the District Court.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, together with their interpretative case law are
abundantly clear: when there are no material issues of fact to be determined, the Court may
interpret the law. Under the facts presented, the Court entered a summary judgement
declaring the existence of a lease between appellees and appellant upon the terms set forth
herein.
The facts of this case are eminently clear and easily understood by the District Court,
appellant's attempt to obfuscate and confuse the issues not withstanding. Appellee Bell
made an offer to purchase the corporation from the appellant. A term of the purchase was
that a lease be given on the building at the agreed upon rate for the agreed upon term. The
parties agreed that all of the other terms were mere technicalities and would be provided by
appellant in a document to be drafted after closing. Two years passed and numerous drafts
have been presented, but none of them have embodied those simple terms agreed upon by
the parties until after the order of the District Court.
The appellant initially offered a lease providing terms very similar to those agreed
upon, but for a much shorter term. R. 73-76. Since that initial document, the terms have
drawn further and further away from the agreement. The appellees ask for only what was
agreed upon by the parties.
The language which the parties agreed upon is clear and unambiguous:
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Lease 5 year Triple Net
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net.
Balance 3 years tie to CPI
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67)
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where the terms of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, its construction by the Court can be done as a matter of law, which makes this
matter clearly a fit subject of a motion for summary judgment:
The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for the court to determine
unless the contract is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' intent (which is
a matter of fact) is necessary to establish the terms of the contract. Saunders
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).
The court more fully examined this issue in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306
P.2d 773 (Utah 1957), in which it stated:
[Ijntent should be ascertained first from the four corners of the instrument
itself, second from other contemporaneous writings, and third from extrinsic
parol evidence of the intentions. If ambiguity can be reconciled from a
reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be
allowed. If the instrument on its face remains ambiguous in spite of the
reasonable construction, the intent may be ascertained in the light of all written
instruments which were a part of the same transaction. If the intent is
ambiguous still, then parol evidence may be admitted, and rales of
construction may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties. (Citations
omitted).
Appellant has argued that the language in question is ambiguous, and that the
document lends itself to two equally possible interpretations, first, the one offered by
appellees, and second the one that allows for the adjustment of the rent to the "fair market
value." Appellant's argument requires that the Court read a good deal into the contract to
reach its conclusion. Nowhere in any of the various documents, agreements and memoranda
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executed by the parties do the words "fair market value" appear. The only place this issue
was ever discussed was between appellant and his broker. R. 214, 220-221. Assuming, for
the purposes of this argument that the statements by appellant and his broker as offered in
the Affidavits are true, and that appellant and his broker actually discussed these issues, there
is no factual allegation that the information was actually communicated to appellee Bell.
Indeed, appellant is trapped by his own arguments under Utah law. The Utah
Supreme Court has ruled on this issue with great clarity. Where a party is responsible for
the drafting of a document and there is more than one possible interpretation of the
document, the document is to be construed against the party who drafted the document.
"The well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of a
contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn the agreement," Sears v.
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982).
The uncontroverted facts are clear. Appellant and his agent drafted the counteroffer.
The counteroffer was accepted by appellee Bell. The District Court found that the terms of
the counteroffer are clear and unambiguous. Under the best analysis offered by appellant,
and granting all of appellant's facts, the answer is the same: If there are, indeed, two equally
plausible interpretations of the written contract (which is not the case) the two interpretations
offered must be construed against the draftsman of the counteroffer, and appellee must
prevail.
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B.

APPELLEE BELL HAS NOTADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES
HAVE NEVER AGREED TO ANY LEASE.

Appellee Bell has not admitted that the parties have never agreed to any lease. The
language quoted from his deposition is quoted out of context and the meaning placed upon
by the appellant was not that clearly indicated in the deposition. The question was posed
after a long a meticulous review of draft after draft of proposed leases which did not embody
the basic terms agreed upon by the parties. To complete the quote: "Hence our being here."
It was appellee Bell's intent to say that the appellant had never tendered a lease embodying
the terms in question to him, thus the matter required resort to the Court. See: Second
Affidavit of L. Stanley Bell. R. 397-398. To the contrary, Appellee Bell's statement was
an affirmation of his position that although the parties had completed their agreement, that
the formal agreement had not been produced by Appellant as required by the agreement.

C.

APPELLEE BELL HAS NOTADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES
HAVE NEVER AGREED TO ALL OF THE MATERIAL TERMS
OF A COMMERCIAL LEASE.

Appellee Bell has admitted that there are more teims to a lease than those set forth in
the agreement of the parties. This is obvious. Appellee Bell asserts that the only terms that
were material to him in the lease were those set forth in the counteroffer, and that in fact, if
the terms of the counteroffer were included in the agreement, he would have accepted every
lease proposed by appellant. See: Second Affidavit of L. Stanley Bell. R. 397-398.
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D.

THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES REGARDING LEASE PAYMENT

The facts of this case are eminently clear and easily understood, appellant's attempt
to obfuscate and confuse the issues not withstanding. The facts are that appellee Bell made
an offer to purchase the assets of the corporation from the appellant. A term of the purchase
was that a lease be given on the building at an agreed upon rate for an agreed upon term.
The parties agreed that all of the other terms were mere technicalities and would be provided
by appellant in a document to be drafted after closing. Two years passed and numerous
drafts have been presented, but none of them have embodied those simple terms agreed upon
by the parties until after the order of the District Court.
The appellant initially offered a lease providing terms very similar to those agreed
upon, but for a much shorter term. Since that initial document, the terms have drawn further
and further away from the agreement. The appellees ask for only what was agreed upon by
the parties.
The language which the parties agreed upon is clear and unambiguous:
Lease 5 year Triple Net
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net.
Balance 3 years tie to CPI
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where the terms of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, its construction by the Court can be done as a matter of law, which allows the
Court to deny appellant's Motion out of hand without even reaching the supposed issues:
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The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for the court to determine
unless the contract is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' intent (which is
a matter of fact) is necessary to establish the terms of the contract. Saunders
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).
The court more fully examined this issue in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306
P.2d 773 (Utah 1957), in which it stated:
[Ijntent should be ascertained first from the four corners of the instrument
itself, second from other contemporaneous writings, and third from extrinsic
parol evidence of the intentions. If ambiguity can be reconciled from a
reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be
allowed. If the instrument on its face remains ambiguous in spite of the
reasonable construction, the intent may be ascertained in the light of all written
instruments which were a part of the same transaction. If the intent is
ambiguous still, then parol evidence may be admitted, and rules of
construction may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties. (Citations
omitted).
Appellant has argued that the language in question is ambiguous, and that the
document lends itself to two equally possible interpretations, first, the one offered by
appellees, and second the one that allows for the adjustment of the rent to the "fair market
value." Appellant's argument requires that the Court read a good deal into the contract to
reach its conclusion. Nowhere in any of the various documents, agreements and memoranda
executed by the parties do the words "fair market value" appear. The only place this issue
was ever discussed was between appellant and his broker. R. 214, 220-221. Assuming, for
the purposes of this argument that the statements by appellant and his broker as offered in
the Affidavits are true, and that appellant and his broker actually discussed these issues, there
is no factual allegation that the information was actually communicated to appellee Bell.
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Appellant once again cannot prevail under Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court has
ruled on this issue with great clarity. Where a party is responsible for the drafting of a
document and there is more than one possible interpretation of the document, the document
is to be construed against the party who drafted the document. "The well-established rule
in Utah is that any uncertainly with respect to construction of a contract should be resolved
against the party who had drawn the agreement," Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 Utah
(1982).
The uncontroverted facts are clear. Appellant and his agent drafted the counteroffer.
The counteroffer was accepted by appellee Bell. Appellees believe that the terms of the
counteroffer are clear and unambiguous. The District Court agreed. Under the best analysis
offered by appellant, and granting all of appellant's facts, the answer is the same: If there are,
indeed, two equally plausible interpretations of the written contract (which appellants
strongly dispute, since the so called plausible explanation requires reading something into
the agreement that even appellant does not allege was discussed between the parties) the two
interpretations offered must be construed against the draftsman of the counteroffer, and
appellees must prevail.
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E.

THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT. APPELLEES ARE
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND BY THE
DEFINITION OF THIS RELIEF APPELLANTS ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

By arguing for summary judgment on his own behalf, appellant concedes that there
are no factual issues. The facts are fully before the Court as set forth in the Counteroffer:
Lease 5 year Triple Net
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net.
Balance 3 years tie to CPI
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67)
The holding of the District provides the best legal analysis against the appellant's flawed
argument for summary judgment:
The Court would find that in looking at the counter offer of the
contingency removal and then the closing that occurred on this
particular sale, it is clear to the Court that the terms of the
payment are unambiguous. It said specifically in the counter
offer made by Mr. Eagar and dated by him, under that term it
was a five year triple net lease, fixed rate for the first 24 months
at $2,281. The balance of the three years would be tied to the
CPI and then there was a on five year option. That's not
ambiguous in any way.
It becomes even less subject to ambiguity when you look at the
contingency removal which, again, was signed by Mr. Eagar,
and, again, provided that they would enter into a lease
agreement with a base rate of $2,281 per month for the first 24
months plus three years additional with an adjusted base tied to
the CPI plus one five year option to reinstate. Also- or to
renew. Also tied to the Consumer Price Index. This lease shall
be triple net and the lease would be drawn outside of closing.
The Court would find that these terms are unambiguous. Triple
net is a term of art, widely accepted within the industry and
business world; that the Consumer Price Index is also well
known and accepted and used in many facets of our business

Page-13-

life and other governmental capacities to make computations
and adjustments based upon that Consumer Price Index.
Therefore, the Court will grant partial summary judgment and
find that the agreement entered into by the parties was that they
would enter into a lease agreement; that the terms of payment
would $2,281 per month for the first 24 months. The balance of
the three years would be adjusted pursuant to the Consumer
Price Index and there is no ambiguity as to what was meant by
adjusted based because the sentence before in the Contingency
Removal refers to the base rate at $2,281 per month. So, there
is no question. We're talking about the same thing. That the
lease would be triple net which under the common parlance and
understanding in the industry means property taxes, utilities,
maintenance and insurance. The Court would find that it
provides again for a renewable option for an additional five
years, again tied to the Consumer Price Index. So the court
grants summary partially on that particular issue. R. 590 at 2830.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellees respectfully request that this Court: (1) sustain
the decision of the trial court granting appellee's motion for partial summary judgment; and
(2) sustaining the decision of the trial court in denying appellant's motion for summary
judgment.
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Dated trustify day of May, 2000.
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C.

'esleyT/r Argyle
David O. Black
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Counterclaim
Defendants and Appellees Eagar, Inc. and
L. Stanley Bell
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^fyh day of May, 2000,1 caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Paul M. Durham
Steve K. Gordon
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary.
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